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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A CONTINUUM IN REMEDIES: RECONNECTING VACANT
HOUSES TO THE MARKET

JAMES J. KELLY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
For decades, America’s older, undercrowded cities have struggled with
neighborhoods beset by vacant houses that seemingly have no connection with
a functioning real estate market. Working-class communities once teeming
with homeowners are now pockmarked by derelict houses and overgrown lots
that attract crime and deter investment. Even as inner-city crime rates continue
their downward trend and environmentally conscious resistance to
metropolitan sprawl mounts, the residential areas closest to America’s
downtowns appear to be losing the battle against the virulent vacant property
contagion.
A nationwide foreclosure crisis has brought attention to the need for innercity and other metropolitan communities to address vacant house nuisances. In
1995, Cleveland already had tens of thousands of vacant properties.1 In the ten
years that followed, foreclosures in Cleveland doubled, and then doubled again
between 2005 and 2007.2 Recognizing the far-reaching effects of the
foreclosure crisis, Congress created the Neighborhood Stabilization Program
(NSP), which has provided approximately $7 billion in assistance to states and
cities hardest hit by the fallout from the foreclosure epidemic.3 The National
Vacant Properties Campaign, itself founded in 2004, merged in 2010 with the
* Clinical Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Timothy Williams, Blighted Cities Prefer Razing to Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/us/blighted-cities-prefer-razing-to-rebuilding.html.
2. CLAUDIA COULTON & KATHY HEXTER, FED. RESERVE BANK, FACING THE
FORECLOSURE CRISIS IN GREATER CLEVELAND: WHAT HAPPENED AND HOW COMMUNITIES
ARE RESPONDING 4 (2010).
3. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(2008) (created NSP with $3.92 billion); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (commonly referred to as Dodd-Frank, which
appropriated $2 billion to NSP 2 and $1 billion to NSP 3, respectively). NSP 3 Funds can be used
only for five eligible uses: 1) Use financing mechanisms for purchase and redevelopment; 2)
Purchase and rehabilitate for sale, rental, or redevelopment; 3) Establish and operate land banks;
4) Demolish blighted structures; and 5) Redevelop vacant properties for housing. Housing
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 § 257.
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Genesee Institute, of Flint, Michigan, to form the Center for Community
Progress, a nationwide advocacy and technical assistance provider for
communities struggling with vacant property problems.4
It would seem, at first glance, that insufficient demand for these types of
homes in these neighborhoods fully accounts for the spread of house vacancy.
Any attempts to fight the market and turn back the clock would then be
hopelessly unsustainable. But, such resignation is unwarranted.
Because the elimination of vacant house nuisances, whether by
rehabilitation or demolition, involves significant financial investment,5 it is
crucial that public officials pay attention to the market dynamics of the
neighborhood. But they must not take an owner’s allowing property to lapse
into and remain in a derelict state as an indication that the market has rendered
a final (and correct) judgment. Even those who hold up the market as an
efficient allocator of resources that should not be hampered recognize that their
trust in it is based on certain assumptions necessary to its functioning
properly.6 Markets work if actors can recognize and take advantage of
opportunities to invest.7 While government regulation can create barriers to
efficient transactions, low-capacity owners, information costs, and property
fragmentation can also get in the way of worthwhile investment.8 Legal tools
can work to reduce these impediments to market functioning.9
This paper argues that recent developments in property theory help us
understand and complete reforms of legal remedies that target certain types of
market dysfunction. By appropriately reducing barriers to sensible investment,
in rem code enforcement through tailored tax foreclosure proceedings can
reverse decline in struggling neighborhoods. Traditional responses to the
problem of blight reflect a binary choice between strong deference to propertyowner autonomy and complete liquidation of property interests.10 In personam
code enforcement remedies emanate from a legal understanding of real estate

4. Dan Kildee, Foreword to FRANK S. ALEXANDER, LAND BANKS AND LAND BANKING, at
8 (2011).
5. CITY OF SOUTH BEND, VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TASK FORCE REPORT 5
(2013), available at http://southbendin.gov/sites/default/file/files/Code_FinalVATF_Report_2_
red.pdf.
6. See generally Christine Jolls et. al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
7. Id. at 1483.
8. See generally Jolls et. al, supra note 6.
9. See OFFICE OF POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
REVITALIZING FORECLOSED PROPERTIES WITH LANDBANKS 13 (2009).
10. James J. Kelly, Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant Building Receivership as a Tool
for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV. L. 210, 211 (2004).
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ownership as the strongest of property-rule-protected entitlements.11 Local
government authorities hold owners directly accountable for any failures to
address specific property problems through imposition of fines and threats of
contempt.12 Eminent domain, on the other hand, is invoked to facilitate
massive redevelopment. When individualized policing of code norms breaks
down, government’s only other apparent option is to declare failure and start
from scratch.13
Traditional code enforcement works fairly well against owners that are
amenable to such pressures and that hold properties in functioning
neighborhood real estate markets.14 But, in areas that have many abandoned
properties, owners are unable to obtain the resources to complete repairs; and,
even in healthier neighborhoods, owners may strategically evade conventional
enforcement or be genuinely incapable of fixing up the property or transferring
it to someone who can.15 Eminent domain, on the other hand, can be
unnecessarily drastic and is usually driven by a massive new building project,
which may be unrealistic for a city that is, on the whole, shrinking.
Inner-city neighborhoods in strong regional markets, as well as those in
regions experiencing continuing out-migration, must fill the gap between
traditional code enforcement’s total deference to the owner’s right to exclude,
on the one hand, and eminent domain’s willy-nilly liquidation of all property
rights. A neighborhood market that is strong enough to support full-scale
rehabilitation of any structurally sound vacant house may weaken irreversibly
if subjected to even spot use of eminent domain authority. Yet, as will be
shown below, traditional code enforcement remedies may not be able to bring
about even those renovations supported by market logic. Sometimes, the owner
is unwilling or unable to carry out a rehabilitation that will be good not only
for the neighborhood but for the owner as well. More commonly, the owner

11. Id. “A property rule entitlement protection approach assumes that an entitlement will
only be transferred, modified, or terminated through a transaction in which the price, if any, is
determined by consensual agreement of the parties, i.e., by market forces, however efficient or
inefficient, fair or unfair, those forces may be.” John A. Lovett, Meditations on Strathclyde:
Controlling Private Land Use Restrictions at the Crossroads of Legal Systems, 36 SYRACUSE J.
INT’L L. & COM. 1, 34 (2008).
12. Kelly, supra note 10, at 215.
13. See id. at 215–16 (“Traditional code enforcement cannot force all vacant property
owners to the realization that if they want to continue to own their houses then they must bring
them into compliance with the code. Even if fines and other coercive mechanisms succeed in
bringing about the rehabilitation of a great number of properties, those vacant houses that are
beyond the code enforcement’s reach persist as a threat to an urban neighborhood in transition . . .
The economic security of urban-healthy neighborhoods and cities requires an additional approach
to vacant building code enforcement.”).
14. Id. at 215.
15. Id. at 214.
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would benefit from the additional investment, if only the owner had any equity
in the property to begin with. Foreclosure of some kind may be the only way to
reconnect this property to the market. Particularly when lenders are more
hesitant to take ownership of derelict properties, a government tool for
bringing about a change in ownership based upon lack of code compliance is
needed.
For weaker neighborhood markets, rehabilitation on a one-by-one basis
may be impossible without an unrealistic amount of public subsidy. Just as
dysfunction in the ownership of a single parcel may require an alternative
approach to code enforcement, fragmented land ownership in a very weak
market may require the coordination of investment through land assembly.
Some neighborhood markets may support further investment if all the vacant
properties in them can be rehabilitated concurrently. While single-property
liquidation, or title assembly, is best carried out by code enforcement related
foreclosure, property tax foreclosure provides the more effective means for
land assembly.16
Part I provides an overview of the barriers that inner-city neighborhoods
must surmount in order to abate vacant house nuisances and regain community
vibrancy. Part II shows that any comprehensive vacant house abatement
strategy needs to contend with the transaction costs caused by owner inaction
and property fragmentation by filling in the remedy gap between in personam
code enforcement and eminent domain. Part III reviews existing innovations
and lays out the essential features of the remedies needed.
I. BARRIERS TO VACANT HOUSE NUISANCE ABATEMENT
A.

How Vacant Houses Impact Neighborhoods

All, or almost all, vacant houses start off as recently occupied houses. Both
in common usage and official terminology, the difference between “vacant”
and “unoccupied” is generally a matter of time, with “vacant” often being
defined as unoccupied for more than 90 days.17 Lack of occupancy, even for an
extended period, does not by itself constitute a nuisance.18 But, long-term

16. See U.S. DEPT. HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REVITALIZING FORECLOSED PROPERTIES WITH
LAND BANKS 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/land
banks.pdf.
17. U.S. POSTAL SERV., PUBLICATION 32: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 230 (July 2013), available
at http://about.usps.com/publications/pub32.pdf (stating 90 days unoccupied and not receiving
mail is considered an unoccupied delivery point). Addresses that are demolished or so blighted as
to be judged not likely receive mail in the near future are considered a no-stat delivery point. Id.
at 148.
18. See CMTY. LEGAL RES., VACANT PROPERTY LEGAL MANUAL 17 (2009) (discussing the
importance of maintaining vacant properties, then discussing the importance of preventing the
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vacancy predictably leads to neglect and decay. Water, sun, and wind
constantly batter roofs, windows, siding, and gutters. Lack of occupancy and
the attendant lack of income inevitably occasion lack of vigilance and lack of
maintenance. Exposure to the elements degrades the exterior of the house first
and makes its neglect apparent to even the casual observer.
Signs of vacancy also invite intentional abuse.19 Vandals can, in a few
minutes, casually inflict damage that would take nature years to bring about.
Thieves may not find much in the way of valuable personal property left
behind, but they can, and do, take the copper piping and wiring right out of the
walls for resale as scrap.20 Their ham-fisted demolition can endanger neighbors
by creating gas leaks and floods.21 In 2010, fifteen families on Cleveland’s
west side were left homeless by a gas explosion in a vacant house ransacked by
a thief stealing copper and appliances.22
Once man or nature has broken them open, unsecured properties either
remain open to casual entry or are boarded up. Both futures are problematic for
the immediate community. An unsecured property solicits trespass.23 A study
of unsecured vacant properties found 83% of them showed signs of
unauthorized occupancy or criminal activity.24 Squatters may start fires in the
property for cooking or heat.25 These and other activities lead to various
emergencies that often require police, fire, and emergency medical personnel
to enter poorly lit, dangerous spaces.26

home from becoming a nuisance to the community). For a discussion of a legal definition of
structures that are per se unsafe, see infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
19. CMTY. LEGAL RES., supra note 18, at 1.
20. Amanda Pinto, ‘Scrapper’ Faces 57 Charges in West Haven Copper Thefts, NEW
HAVEN REG. (June 2, 2011), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20110601/scrapper-faces57-charges-in-west-haven-copper-thefts.
21. Id.; Nok-Noi Ricker, Brewer City Council Finds Dilapidated House a Danger, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 8, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/10/08/news/bangor/brewer-citycouncil-finds-dilapidated-house-adanger/; Mark Puente, Explosion Destroys 4 Homes, Damages
Dozens in Cleveland Blast has Eerie Similarities to One on West Side in January, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, May 13, 2010, at A1.
22. Pat Galbincea and Gabriel Baird, Blast at Vacant West Side House Leaves at Least 15
Families Homeless, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 26, 2010, at B3; Stan Donaldson, Man
Sentenced for Thefts from Home that Later Exploded, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 3, 2010,
at B3.
23. Kelly, supra note 10, at 212–13.
24. William Spelman, Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 481,
481–95 (1993).
25. Jim Cook, Jr., Squatter With Cooking Equipment May Have Caused Millville Fire, S.
JERSEY TIMES (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nj.com/cumberland/index.ssf/2011/11/squatter_with_
cooking_equipmen.html.
26. 3 Firefighters Hurt in Blaze Damaging 3 Vacant Homes, INDY STAR (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://www.indystar.com/article/20120827/NEWS/120827001.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

114

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII:109

If a rundown vacant building signals neighborhood decline, a boarded-up
property blares that message out through a megaphone. James Wilson and
George Kelling’s classic article about the impact of small, seemingly
superficial signs of disorder was entitled Broken Windows.27 It demonstrated
how subtle signals of decline can accelerate it.28 There is nothing subtle,
however, about a house that has all its windows covered by 3´ by 5´ pieces of
plywood. It broadcasts the news that the neighborhood is in bad shape now and
is not expected to improve anytime soon. Prospective residents who have
choices about where they might live are unlikely to choose a block with a
boarded-up house on it.29 Nevertheless, some communities have recognized
that boarded properties, which are uninhabitable, and very visibly so, are
preferable to houses that are open to casual entry.30 The City of Augusta,
Georgia has passed an ordinance establishing a permit process for
“mothballing” vacant houses.31
Whether boarded or open to casual entry, visibly uninhabitable vacant
properties have devastating effects on the surrounding community. Vacant
houses inflict tremendous costs on residents of adjacent properties,
neighborhoods, and city governments.32 They attract crime, harbor vermin, and
pose a danger for community children.33 They can destroy nearby houses
through fire and water damage.34 Adjacent property owners have found it
costly, and sometimes impossible, to get casualty and liability insurance
because of a vacant house next door. 35 It is little wonder that the presence of
vacant houses reduces the resale value of compliant houses within a block or
two by at least 1.3% per vacant house.36

27. See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
28. Id.
29. Kelly, supra note 10, at 212.
30. See Johnny Edwards, Mothball Ordinance Creates Complaints, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Jan.
28, 2008), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2008-01-28/mothball-ordinance-creates-com
plaints; Susan McCord, “Mothball’ permits aren’t solutions for all blighted sites in Augusta,
AUGUSTA CHRON. (JULY 12, 2011), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/government/2011-07-12/
mothball-permits-aren-t-solutions-all-blighted-sites-augusta.
31. Edwards, supra note 30.
32. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 10–11.
33. Brian Nordli, Boy Killed in Fire was Playing with Brother Inside Vacant Home, LAS
VEGAS SUN (May 2, 2013), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/may/02/house-fire-claimslife-las-vegas-child/.
34. See Ricker, supra note 21; Puente, supra note 21.
35. NAT’L VACANT PROPS. CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COST TO
COMMUNITIES 11 (2005).
36. STEPHEN WHITAKER & THOMAS J. FITZPATRICK, IV, THE IMPACT OF VACANT, TAXDELINQUENT AND FORECLOSED PROPERTY ON SALES PRICES OF NEIGHBORING HOME 2 (2012)
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How Local Governments Respond to Vacant House Problems

With so much at stake, state and local governments in many states have
made addressing vacant properties a top policy priority. They have moved
beyond traditional public nuisance remedies and enacted a range of policy
solutions targeted at mitigating or eliminating vacant house problems.
Realizing the need for more and better data about the vacant houses in their
communities, cities such as Wilmington and Cincinnati have enacted vacant
property registration ordinances.37 Often these ordinances provide for the
collection not only of information but of money as well.38 By taxing owner
inaction, these ordinances point toward the primary response to vacant houses:
code enforcement.39
Section 115 of the International Building Code (IBC) provides for the
definition of and official response to unsafe structures.40 The law provides the
local building official with the authority to identify structures as unsafe and
ensure that they are “taken down and removed or made safe.”41 Unsafe
buildings include those that are “insanitary, deficient in light and ventilation or
adequate exit facilities, constitute a fire hazard or are otherwise dangerous to
human life.”42 Apart from declaring any vacant structure that is “not secured
against entry” to be unsafe,43 the IBC does not explicitly address vacant
buildings as unsafe structures. It does not delineate what kinds of structural
deficiencies are unsafe when a building has no one living, or even going, inside
it regularly.
State and local law authorizing enforcement action against vacant property
nuisances have filled this gap. In addition to adopting the IBC statewide,
Indiana has also enacted an unsafe building law that it allows local

(“We find that an additional property within 500 feet that is vacant, delinquent, or both reduces
the home’s selling price by at least 1.3 percent.”).
37. Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The Forgotten First
Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 136–42 (2009). See
also Yun Sang Lee et al., New Data on Local Vacant Property Registration Ordinances, 15
CITYSCAPE: J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 289, 260 (2013).
38. “Registration fees can range from $70 per year (Chula Vista, California), to $420 per
quarter (San Jose, California), to up to $5,000 per year (Wilmington, Delaware).” Schilling, supra
note 37, at 132.
39. Id. at 134.
40. The International Building Code has been adopted, either jurisdiction-wide or by local
governments, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. INT’L CODE COUNCIL,
INTERNATIONAL CODES-ADOPTION BY STATE (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.iccsafe.org/
gr/Documents/stateadoptions.pdf.
41. INT’L BLDG. CODE § 116.1 (2012).
42. INT’L BLDG. CODE § 116.1.
43. INT’L BLDG. CODE § 116.1.
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jurisdictions to adopt by ordinance.44 That statute’s definition of an unsafe
building tracks, more or less, the IBC definition, but includes a structure that is
“vacant and not maintained in a manner that would allow human habitation,
occupancy, or use under the requirements of a statute or an ordinance”45 This
extension of the concept of an unsafe building subjects any vacant property not
fit to be lived in to an order to repair immediately or even demolish the
structure.46 The statute, however, requires that any ordered action “be
reasonably related to the condition of the unsafe premises and the nature and
use of nearby properties.”47 Thus, an order to repair must focus on those
deficiencies that either make a property a danger or make it unfit for
occupancy and cannot extend to preventative maintenance.48 Likewise, a
demolition order must be justified by the building’s severely deteriorated
condition and its lack of prospects for prompt renovation.49
The IBC authorizes enforcement generally, but does not specify the
methods or penalties.50 Enforcement mechanisms and standards are left for
state and local adopters to provide, usually through modification of the IBC or
enactment of separate legislation.51 Traditional code enforcement involves the
issuance of a notice of violation, the imposition of fines for failure to comply
and, ultimately, resort to judicial orders to correct the violation.52 A court may
enforce its order through contempt proceedings as long as compliance is
possible.53 As discussed below, repairs that cost more than the resulting value
of the property may be impossible to finance through a private mortgage.54 In
the absence of such a loan, an owner of a vacant property may be able to avoid
any proceedings for civil or criminal contempt.55 Thus, the coercive approach

44. IND. CODE § 36-7-9-1 (1982).
45. IND. CODE § 36-7-9-4(a)(6) (2005).
46. IND. CODE § 36-7-9-5(a) (2013).
47. Id.
48. Foursquare Tabernacle Church of God in Christ v. Dep’t of Metro. Dev. Of Consol. City
of Indianapolis, 630 N.E.2d 1381, 1389–90 (Ind. App. 1994) (City could order repair of items in
danger of falling but could not require that chimney be functional).
49. Kopinski v. Health and Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., 766 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ind. App.
2002) (house that required 30% reconstruction two months after fire could not be ordered
demolished when funds for reconstruction were imminent).
50. INT’L BLDG. CODE §§ 113.3, 113.4 (2012).
51. International Code Adoptions, INT’L CODE COUNCIL (2014), http://www.iccsafe.org/gr/
Pages/adoptions.aspx. See also Building Codes, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, (Jan. 25,
2013), http://www.fema.gov/earthquake/building-codes.
52. Kelly, supra note 10, at 214.
53. Shippen v. Shippen, 693 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
54. See infra Part I.C.
55. Id.
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code enforcement may fall apart in the face of a neighborhood market too
weak to support rehabilitation investment.
C. How Neighborhoods Impact Responses to Vacant House Problems
At $50 per square foot, a conservative, “gut” rehabilitation of a 1,500square foot vacant house would cost $75,000. Even houses that can be made
ready for occupancy for substantially less nearly always require more than the
$10,000 that the average demolition and removal would cost.56 Since
elimination of a vacant house nuisance always involves a major capital
investment,57 no sensible response strategy can ignore the importance of the
return on that investment. Even if an owner is willing to make repair
expenditures that cannot be recaptured through increased use, income, or resale
value, no lender may be willing to provide the necessary funds.58 With so
much money involved, the financial advisability of rehabilitation often dictates
whether or not it goes forward.
No factor will limit the return on rehabilitation investment more than the
weakness of the neighborhood real estate market. If the best homes on a block
are not selling for more than $50,000, investing $75,000 in a full-scale
rehabilitation of a vacant property on that block is not financially prudent. For
many older, inner-city neighborhoods, houses without major defects can be
purchased for less than $25,000.59 But, once these properties have fallen into
disrepair, the market will not support their renovation.60 Traditional code
enforcement does not render such considerations irrelevant. In a marginal case,
the inducement of fines and, possibly, imprisonment may well motivate an
owner to rehabilitate a property that would otherwise languish.61 But, in
situations where the verdict of the market is unequivocal, renovation is
unlikely, even with governmental coercion.62
Under such an analysis, it’s not at all surprising that vacant property
problems are so pervasive and intractable. Vacant properties are more a
symptom of, than a major contributing factor to, the decline of older, inner-city
neighborhoods throughout the United States. The tremendous gap between
land values in inner-city and suburban neighborhoods also has little to do with
location per se, but a great deal to do with the quality of local public goods
56. Leila Atassi, Cleveland’s Glut of Vacant Housing Could Cost Billions to Eliminate at
Current Pace, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/in
dex.ssf/2012/09/clevelands_glut_of_vacant_hous.html.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. ROBERT L. KEMP, THE INNER CITY: A HANDBOOK FOR RENEWAL 310 (2001).
60. Kelly, supra note 10, at 214.
61. Id. at 215.
62. Id.
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such as schools, public safety, and shopping and recreational amenities.63
Many inner-city neighborhoods have high concentrations of poverty, a reality
that strongly shapes education, crime and commerce in those places.64
Suburban development was first made possible by legislative moves to prevent
cities from annexing development on their fringes.65 The use of racially
restrictive covenants by early suburban developers ensured that whites would
make up the overwhelming majority of the new residents.66 The use of
exclusionary zoning set up barriers to socioeconomic integration that survived
decades after the judicial rejection of explicit racial discrimination.67 Even as
the courts moved to integrate schools, suburban districts were exempted from
busing remedies unless civil rights plaintiffs could show a history of deliberate
racial discrimination in those relatively new areas.68 Suburban land was
unburdened not only by industrial waste and aging infrastructure, but also by
the taint of a racist past. The message throughout the second-half of the
twentieth century was clear: A family with the economic ability to choose its
neighborhood should move to the land of the fresh start, the suburbs.69
In the inner city, the loss of those low-skill, high-wage manufacturing jobs
that first induced the Great Migration set the stage for widespread
unemployment, civil unrest, and epidemics of violent crime, drug abuse, and
chronic disease.70 Baltimore’s 1950 population of almost 950,000 shrank to a
2010 low just beneath 621,000, a decline of 35%.71 Even as the metropolitan
area as a whole grew, Baltimore’s population dropped by double-digit
percentages in both the 1970s and 1990s.72 A city built for a million residents

63. WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 45–46 (2001).
64. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987);
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS,
BARRIOS AND THE AMERICAN CITY (1997).
65. Christopher J. Tyson, Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering Approaches
to New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REV. 297, 303–23 (2012).
66. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 64, at 51–55.
67. FISCHEL, supra note 63, at 65–71.
68. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974).
69. Id. at 801.
70. WILSON, supra note 64, at 20–92; BERNADETTE HANLON, JOHN RENNIE SHORT &
THOMAS J. VICINO, CITIES AND SUBURBS: NEW METROPOLITAN REALITIES IN THE U.S. 69–70
(2010).
71. Maryland: Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/md190090.txt (last visited April 22, 2014); State &
County QuickFacts: Baltimore, Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/24/2404000.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
72. Id.
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now has more than 30,000 vacant houses and vacant lots.73 As with many
under-crowded urban communities, neither the population loss nor the housing
vacancies are equally distributed throughout the city.74
The much smaller city of South Bend, Indiana also experienced about a
30% loss in population from 1970—six years after its primary industrial
employer, Studebaker, closed for good—to 2010.75 A handful of
neighborhoods on the west side of town lost more than half their populations
during those four decades. 76 Not surprisingly, the majority of the more than
1,000 vacant and abandoned properties in South Bend are located in these
largely African-American and poor neighborhoods.77 But, other South Bend
neighborhoods also have derelict, vacant houses.78 While these neighborhoods
are affected by the litany of urban problems that tamp down demand for
housing in the inner city, their higher housing values keep vacant house
renovation an economic possibility. The presence of protracted vacant house
nuisances in these communities requires further inquiry into the reasons why
properties remain abandoned.
In addition to the formidable array of social problems that diminishes
demand for residences in the central city, inner-city real estate markets face
other challenges as well. These problems do not depress demand so much as
distort the market in which housing is priced. Small lot sizes mean that city
dwellers are more sensitive to the uses, and abuses, that occur on neighboring
properties.79 This proximity can foster greater social capital and take advantage
of positive externalities associated with a vibrant city life.80 But, negative
externalities, like those associated with a derelict, vacant structure, are also
amplified.81 Small lot sizes are a primary reason why the presence of a vacant
house has such powerful effects on the prices of neighboring properties.82
Vacant houses are a cause, as well as a symptom of, weak inner-city market

73. Julie Scharper, Uphill Battle to Rid the City of Vacant Properties, BALT. SUN (Feb. 9,
2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-02-09/news/bs-md-ci-vacants-update-20110209_1_
vacant-homes-vacant-properties-housing-officials.story.
74. See SANDRA J. NEWMAN ET AL., POPULATION DYNAMICS IN BALTIMORE
NEIGHBORHOODS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE NEUTRAL (2001).
75. CITY OF SOUTH BEND, supra note 5, at 7.
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 10.
78. Id.
79. Kelly, supra note 10, at 212.
80. Edward Glaeser & Joshua Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City, at 20
(Harv. Inst. Econ. Res., Paper No. 2109, 2006). But see Nicole Garnett, The People Paradox,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 47 (whether because urban dwellers lack time or diversity reduces trust
levels, total social capital in cities may be lower than in suburbs).
81. Kelly, supra note 10, at 212.
82. See id.
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neighborhoods because these communities are so dense.83 Interdependence
requires effective measures of accountability.84
Fragmentation of city land into small lots requires a buyer to be as
concerned about his or her neighbors’ investments in their properties almost as
much as his or her care for his or her own property.85 But, fragmentation
within the ownership of a property can frustrate appropriate investment as
well. Like suburban owners, inner-city homeowners have mortgages on their
homes. But, the unsustainable spread of subprime lending, especially in
communities of color, led to a wave of foreclosures that has produced many
more vacant houses.86 The confusing array of lender assignments and loan
servicer changes that frustrated borrowers seeking loan modifications also
made it very difficult to identify and contact those responsible for recently
foreclosed properties.87 When the vacant houses became burdens rather than
assets for lenders, foreclosures were aborted, leaving even more confusion as
to who had the authority and responsibility for maintaining them.88 When legal
ownership of a property is in limbo, even cost-effective investments and
maintenance will fall between the cracks.89 To foster sustainability in the urban
core, vacant house nuisance remedies should focus on making sure markets
work effectively by internalizing costs of vacant houses to those responsible
and coordinating investment in the face of property fragmentation.
II. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF REMEDIES
The conventional governmental response to urban decline has focused on
cost internalization and investment coordination, albeit separately. Traditional
code enforcement has sought to make derelict property owners feel the pain
they inflict on the members of the community.90 When the economics of
decline has overwhelmed such case-by-case policing, redevelopment officials
have, sometimes and after much delay, invoked the nuclear option of eminent

83. Id.
84. See id. at 213.
85. Id. at 212 (citing WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT 43–45 (2001)).
86. Kermit J. Lind, The Perfect Storm: An Eyewitness Account from Ground Zero in
Cleveland’s Neighborhoods, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 237, 239 (2007).
87. Id. at 247.
88. Michelle Conlin, CFPB targets “zombie” foreclosures after Reuters report, REUTERS,
March 13, 2014; David A. Dana, Why Mortgage “Formalities” Matter, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 505, 506 (2012).
89. See Kelly, supra note 10, at 213–16.
90. Id.
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domain, the ultimate in investment coordination.91 These two poles of the
vacant property nuisance abatement spectrum correspond to the basic division
of legal remedies generally. In personam remedies use sanctions to affect
internalization of costs, in the vacant property context, to have a landowner
bear all the external costs associated with his or her ownership of the land.92 In
rem responses, on the other hand, focus on the ownership of the property rather
than the actions of the landowner.93 Eminent domain coordinates investment
by bringing fragmented property into unified ownership, assembling both title
interests within parcels and parcels within the contiguous redevelopment
area.94 Code enforcement preserves the autonomy of the owner but forces him
or her to bear the responsibility of it.95 Eminent domain liquidates ownership
of the property and gives the owner its fair market value in cash.96
A classic work of legal scholarship categorized property entitlements by
the types of remedies that law and equity offered to protect them.97 In Property
Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed noted that some entitlements enjoy
protection by injunction while the holders of other entitlements can expect only
money damages as compensation.98 Owners in the former category, which the
authors call property rule entitlements, can name their price on any sale of their
entitlements because, backed by the power of court order, they cannot be made
to transfer their entitlements on any other terms.99 Liability rule entitlements,
however, can be liquidated at some adjudicated price, usually their fair market
value.100 Use of liability rules eliminate holdout problems and reduce other
transaction costs.101 Property rule approaches persist in land ownership due to
the high degree of personal investment put into it and the need for stability.102

91. Lavea Brachman, Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Vacant and Abandoned Property:
Remedies for Acquisition and Redevelopment, 17 LAND LINES, no. 4, 2005, at 4, available at
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1057_Vacant-and-Abandoned-Property.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Kelly, supra note 10, at 219–20.
95. Id. at 214.
96. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP,
USE, AND CONSERVATION 178–79 (2006).
97. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
98. Id. at 1105.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1106.
101. Id. at 1107.
102. Id. at 1108.
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Traditional code enforcement pressures owners through fines without
interfering directly with their autonomy.103 As such, it represents a property
rule approach.104 But, the use of eminent domain in urban redevelopment
demonstrates that even land ownership can be rendered a liability rule
entitlement.105 It protects the cash value of the owner’s interest even as it
liquidates it to achieve land assembly goals.106 As shown above, traditional
code enforcement can succeed in neighborhoods with high land values but is
less effective when the owner’s net gains from rehabilitation diminish.107
Eminent domain is a sledgehammer that gains control of nuisance properties
but only after destroying, rather than supporting, the confidence of neighboring
property owners.108 The space between these two extremes provides
opportunities for innovation.
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have demonstrated that certain
legal rules move between both types of remedial protection.109 Dubbing these
pliant remedial structures, which the authors call “pliability rules”, Bell and
Parchomovsky show how the law can calibrate protection of in-kind
entitlements to produce efficient results.110 Foreclosure represents the
prominent pliability rule structure associated with land ownership.111 When an
owner’s title has been conditioned on repayment of a debt, foreclosure
proceedings determine at what point his or her equity of redemption, his or her
right to pay off the debt and preserve the in-kind nature of the land ownership,
will be terminated and the property transferred to or on behalf of the

103. Kelly, supra note 10, at 215.
104. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 97, at 1092 n.7.
105. The only prior constraint, the “public use” requirement has been interpreted broadly by
federal courts and many, though not all, state courts interpreting similar provision in state
constitutions. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488–89 (2005); Honolulu v. Sherman,
129 P.3d 542, 580 (Haw. 2006); R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 107–08 (R.I.
2006). But see County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 788 (Mich. 2004); Norwood v.
Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1152 (Ohio 2006).
106. James J. Kelly Jr., Bringing Clarity to Title Clearing: Tax Foreclosure and Due Process
in the Internet Age, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 63, 73 (2008).
107. Kelly, supra note 10, at 215.
108. G. Davis Mathues, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Domain after Kelo,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1682 (2006).
109. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002).
110. Id. at 63.
111. Bell and Parchomovsky identify eminent domain as “the most famous instance of
pliability rule protection” because the property rule protection gives way to liability protection
only “upon [the government] making a decision by a process specified in law.” Id. at 59. But, the
right of redemption at issue in the foreclosure proceeding provides a more meaningful example of
a legal gateway between property and liability rule protection. Kelly, supra note 106, at 100.
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creditor.112 Most foreclosure sales are liability rule approaches in that they do
not cause the owner to forfeit the monetary value of remaining equity but
preserve it by requiring any surplus net sale proceeds to be paid out to those
who were foreclosed upon.113 Foreclosure proceedings start with the
borrower’s interest in the collateral as a property rule entitlement moving
towards a liability rule entitlement.114 The focus of the procedure is to
determine when the owner’s time to redeem has finally elapsed.115
To use pliability rules in the context of vacant house remediation, we need
to develop in rem foreclosure remedies that make noncompliance with public
norms a basis for liquidating the existing title interests. To be effective not
only against the owner but all stakeholders in the property, the threat of
foreclosure must be based on a lien that takes priority over all existing private
interests, a so-called super-priority lien.116 Vacant building receivership sales
and property tax foreclosure proceedings use such liens.117 Deploying a
foreclosure mechanism based upon an owner’s failure to pursue a feasible
rehabilitation moves code enforcement strategy from a sanction against willful
failure to comply to a price-based approach that reveals the property’s potential
value and the costs of realizing it.118 By putting delinquent owners in
competition with other potential rehabilitators, this code-based foreclosure
method makes sure those properties that can be fixed up are.119
When even the most effective cost internalization is insufficient to achieve
rehabilitation, there is no need to turn immediately to the extreme of eminent
domain. Investment coordination can also be achieved through a pliability
rule’s conditional deference to the owner’s property rights.120 Rather than take
all properties in a severely distressed neighborhood, a coordinated use of
property tax foreclosure can assemble those properties that owners have
walked away from, as evidence by their failure to pay delinquent property
taxes.121 Under this calibrated approach to investment coordination, owners

112. Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1438 (2004).
113. See Kelly, supra note 106, at 99.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 99–100.
116. Frank Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales and Due Process, 75 IND. L. J. 747, 748 (2000).
117. Id. at 770; Kelly, supra note 10, at 223; Kelly, supra note 106, at 73.
118. See Kelly, supra note 10, at 217.
119. Id. at 226.
120. Id.
121. See Matthew J. Samsa, Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance Suits
and Land Banks to Pursue Economic Redevelopment, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 201–02 (2008).
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fully committed to their properties will not suffer the demoralization costs
associated with invocation of eminent domain.122
An in rem approach to code enforcement can force cost internalization in
new and effective ways. A land assembly method that allows private property
owners a chance to redeem coordinates investment without demoralizing
existing property owners.123 Before turning to particularized descriptions of
how vacant building receivership sales and vacant property tax foreclosures are
best structured, I will walk through how these two foreclosure pliability
structures fill the gap between traditional code enforcement and eminent
domain.
As discussed above, urban real estate markets face a significant challenge
in small lot sizes.124 Urban property owners must be almost as concerned with
their neighbor’s investment and upkeep choices as they are with their own.125
The lapse of an unoccupied house into a derelict condition imposes an external
cost upon the neighbors.126 By sanctioning serious and visible code violations,
local governments try to make responsible owners feel their neighbors’ pain.127
Private rights of action can give those neighbors a more direct way to shift
their costs to liable owners.128 Tort approaches have their own costs.129 Rarely
can those costs be easily shared when many neighbors are affected.130 In the
end, the ultimate effectiveness of the private remedy will depend on the
feasibility of collecting money judgments.131
While in personam remedies also focus on money, they are not quite so
limited as a civil suit for damages. Many jurisdictions allow fines to be

122. See generally Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967)
(asserting “‘Demoralization costs’ are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to
offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization
that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future
production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of
uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they
themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion”).
123. Kelly, supra note 10, at 224. See also Kelly, supra note 106, at 100.
124. Kelly, supra note 10, at 212.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 213.
128. HEATHER K. WAY ET AL., CMTY. DEV. CLINIC, BUILDING HOPE: TOOLS FOR
TRANSFORMING ABANDONED AND BLIGHTED PROPERTIES INTO COMMUNITY ASSETS 12 (2007).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See Kermit J. Lind, Can Public Nuisance Law Protect Your Neighborhood from Big
Banks?, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 89, 104 (2011).
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imposed relatively quickly, sometimes through an administrative process.132
The amount of these fines does not depend on the monetary loss suffered by
neighbors or the public at large.133 Moreover, in many cities, these fines
immediately become liens on the property, often taking first priority over
preexisting private mortgages and liens.134 But traditional code enforcement
sanctions are not limited to the pocketbook.135
When courts are involved, injunctions can be issued and backed up
through findings of contempt.136 While theoretically enforceable through
imprisonment, willful failure to comply with an order to repair generally yields
still larger fines.137 A finding of willfulness requires the court to look into the
costs of compliance and the ability of the owner to afford them.138 As the costs
of rehabilitation can involve tens of thousands of dollars,139 relatively few
owners will have sufficient cash on hand to bring the property into full code
compliance.
Whether administrative or judicial in nature, proceedings to enforce
building code violations require notice to responsible parties.140 Enhanced
enforcement mechanisms involve still greater due process requirements.141
Criminal contempt proceedings, for example, cannot move forward unless the
accused is present in the courtroom.142 When the subject matter is a house that
the owner of record abandoned years ago, tracking down and personally
serving that owner can be a major undertaking.143 Even if the owner lives in
the area, the address provided in official records for him or her may be the
vacant property itself.144 When the owner is an investor in another state or

132. WAY ET AL., supra note 128, at 10, 13.
133. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1532–33 (1984) (stating
that the sanctions approach has an information costs advantage over adjudication of private
lawsuits by stipulating an amount for a penalty rather than investigating the monetary value of the
damages. As long as lawmakers are confident in their definitions of permitted and prohibited
behavior, it is not essential that they set the penalty at some optimal level based on the social cost
imposed by the sanctioned activity).
134. Kelly, supra note 10, at 216.
135. Id. at 215.
136. 17 C.J.S. Contempt §23 (2013).
137. Kelly, supra note 10, at 214.
138. Shippen, 693 S.E.2d at 243–44.
139. See Samsa, supra note 121, at 204–05.
140. 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 121 (2013).
141. See Kelly, supra note 10, at 217–18.
142. Adams v. Epperly, 499 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
143. See Ferris v. State ex rel. Maass, 249 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Wis. 1977); James R. Cohen,
Abandoned Housing: Exploring Lessons From Baltimore, 12 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 415, 435
(2001).
144. Cohen, supra note 143.
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another country, the problems of hailing him or her into court increase
significantly.145 Experienced building code violators are rarely motivated to
make notification easier, especially once they learn the benefits of evading
notices.146
Proceedings that focus on ownership of property rather than adjudicate
personal obligation are in rem, not in personam.147 These proceedings also
require that affected parties receive constitutionally adequate notice.148 But
rules and statutes specifying adequate notice are often less exacting for
foreclosure and other in rem processes than for their in personam
counterparts.149 A plaintiff in a lawsuit for damages against the owner of a
vacant house may be able to proceed without actual, personal service only after
demonstrating that his or her attempts to serve the defendant have been
unsuccessful because of the defendant’s deliberate attempts to evade service.150
The evidence of evasion may prove to be more elusive than the defendant.151
For in rem proceedings, however, a court will only be satisfied once all
reasonable attempts to notify the defendant at all reasonably ascertainable
addresses have been made.152
In personam remedies can light a fire under those who have been slow to
commence a feasible rehabilitation. When the neighborhood market supports
the legally required investment, the threat of fines will frequently succeed in
helping responsible owners appreciate their neighbors’ predicament and
remedy the situation.153 Even when the rehabilitation investment is not assured
to be fully reflected in the resale value of the home, the prospect of significant
fines can make an owner put his or her doubts aside.154 To a lesser extent, a
stubborn or contrary owner can sometimes be coerced to make an investment
in a vacant property that will benefit him or her in the long-term even if he
refuses to see it.155

145. Id.
146. See Kelly, supra note 10, at 214.
147. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199–200 (1977).
148. Id. at 204–06.
149. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311–13 (1950). See also
Kelly, supra note 10, at 218.
150. Slenzka v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 322 (E.D. Mich. 2001). See also Kelly,
supra note 10, at 218; FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
151. See Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a
Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 784 (1994).
152. Michael H. Rubin & E. Keith Carter, Notice of Seizure in Mortgage Foreclosures and
Tax Sale Proceedings: The Ramifications of Mennonite, 48 LA. L. REV. 535, 539 (1988).
153. Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169, 1197 (2008).
154. See id. at 1196–97.
155. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

A CONTINUUM IN REMEDIES

127

But, many times, a financially feasible renovation of a vacant house is so
stymied by an owner’s lack of willingness and/or ability to rehabilitate the
property that neither threats of sanctions nor the sanctions themselves will
produce the needed rehabilitation.156 The coercion approach to cost
internalization as a mode of achieving better pricing and market efficiency
presupposes the capability and rationality of the owner.157 Even if the owner is
able both to recognize and pursue a worthwhile rehabilitation of the property,
he or she may not be able to benefit from the investment due to outstanding
mortgages and liens and may refuse to send good money after bad.158
An owner’s inability to carry out a financially feasible rehabilitation may
stem from a total lack of executive functioning. Working with contractors is
challenging and some owners will be overmatched by the complexity of their
role.159 In some cases, the lack of capacity is much clearer. A mentally
incompetent or deceased owner will not be made to comply with an order to
repair, no matter how sensible the investment is.160 Proper notice of threat of
foreclosure, including special forms of notice to protect owners that lack legal
capacity, may motivate curative action or a voluntary transfer.161 Otherwise, an
owner incapable of meeting basic code obligations must be replaced, making
transfer of title essential to any privately funded abatement of such a vacant
house nuisance.162
An owner unwilling to act prudently makes unlikely not only compliance
by rehabilitation but also limits hope that a voluntary transfer to a rational,
capable owner will happen. An owner who refuses not only to fix the property
but also turns down reasonable purchase offers may have a completely
unrealistic view of its worth.163 Alternatively, the owner may have a strong
personal attachment to the property even though it is no longer habitable.164 In
such cases, an involuntary transfer by means of foreclosing a super-priority
lien presents an attractive alternative to court-ordered coercion. By forcing
156. See id. at 1194.
157. Id. at 1234.
158. Id. at 1236.
159. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home
Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095 (1996).
160. Robin Powers Kinning, Selective Housing Code Enforcement and Low-Income Housing
Policy: Minneapolis Case Study, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159, 181 (1993).
161. C. Tyler Mulligan, Toward a Comprehensive Program for Regulating Vacant or
Abandoned Dwellings in North Carolina: The General Police Power, Minimum Housing
Standards, and Vacant Property Registration, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 32 (2009).
162. Kinning, supra note 160, at 181.
163. See James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not be Moved:” Urban Communities, Eminent
Domain, And The Socioeconomics Of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 923, 968
(2006).
164. Id. at 952.
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such owners to realize that ignoring their responsibilities will cost them their
ownership of the property, a foreclosure based on failure to comply with code
takes a new approach to cost internalization, one in which the cost imposed on
the responsible party is liquidation of their ownership interest.165
If the owner’s interest is underwater, then even a willing seller may not be
able to unload the property. Anyone buying the property will want to acquire it
only once it is free and clear of any liens and encumbrances. If the owner is in
default, the mortgagee may have the legal right to foreclose but elect not to
pursue foreclosure because of doubts about the property condition and the
strength of the neighborhood real estate market.166 Without the foreclosure, the
owner has legal title but no financial stake, while the lender has a financial
interest but lacks legal title.167 When a bargain-and-sale transfer is unavailable,
a title-clearing mechanism such as a super-priority lien foreclosure may be the
only feasible response.
An owner who is forced to choose between eliminating the nuisance or
having his property sold to those who are willing to fix it faces the true market
judgment regarding the decision to invest in rehabilitation.168 If the property is
not worth fixing up right away, there will be no foreclosure because there will
be no buyers willing to take on the responsibility of rehabilitating the
property.169 If, however, the property is located in a neighborhood strong
enough to support investment in it, then the stakeholders are put to the question
as to whether they will preserve their interests and carry out the renovation or
step aside and take the cash value of their stakes in the property in its current
condition.170
Foreclosure produces better cost internalization than traditional code
enforcement in certain cases for two reasons. First, the in rem approach to
procedural due process is not as burdensome as for civil and criminal contempt
proceedings and does not lead to a battle of wills with intransigent
defendants.171 Second, the cost being shifted onto the noncompliant owner in
foreclosure is no longer a fine of questionable collectability but the imminent
loss of his or her ownership in the property.172

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Mulligan, supra note 161, at 32.
Johnson, supra note 153, at 1234.
Id. at 1186.
Kelly, supra note 10, at 211.
Johnson, supra note 153, at 1183–84.
See Mulligan, supra note 161, at 20.
See Kelly, supra note 10, at 217–18.
Johnson, supra note 153, at 1194.
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When Stand-Alone Renovations Do Not Pencil Out—The Need for
Investment Coordination

Fragmentation of urban land into small lots intensifies the externality
problem and the importance of vacant house remediation.173 Effective methods
for cost internalization, for forcing owners to face the true economic decision
before them or replace them with those who will, are essential for those
neighborhoods that still have the strength to justify the investment required for
complete rehabilitation of a vacant property.174 But, what if a neighborhood is
already beset by a dozen or more vacant properties? Fixing up one alone will
not only fail to bring adequate return for that rehabilitator, but it will also not
make an appreciable difference in the neighborhood.175 Here, the
fragmentation associated with city neighborhoods requires remedies to go
beyond cost internalization to more proactive investment coordination.176
The above discussion of vacant, derelict houses in otherwise healthy
neighborhoods examined several cases in which sensible renovations were
frustrated by ownership circumstances. The assumption that the prolonged
presence of a vacant house signals the decline of the neighborhood can be a
self-fulfilling prophecy.177 But, cost internalization remedies that effectively
use the threat of foreclosure can sort out which properties can be brought back
to productive use right away.178 Even in those neighborhoods where renovation
is not supported by the local real estate market, revitalization should not
necessarily be judged unsustainable. Instead of bringing one property back to
productive use, it may be necessary to bring the neighborhood as a whole
back.179
The coordination of real estate investment has been used to justify massive
urban redevelopment projects using eminent domain.180 But, using tax
foreclosure to acquire vacant properties in neighborhoods beset by them offers
a more promising alternative. First, tax foreclosure sidesteps the troubled
history of urban renewal’s use of eminent domain and the more recent populist
backlash that arose from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of
New London.181 Second, the top-down, large scale investment necessary to
justify the use of eminent domain can give way to alternative approaches to
173. Kelly, supra note 106, at 67.
174. See Johnson, supra note 153, at 1194.
175. Id. at 1198.
176. Mulligan, supra note 161, at 3–4.
177. Johnson, supra note 153, at 1181–82.
178. See Kelly, supra note 10, at 217.
179. Mulligan, supra note 161, at 2–3.
180. See Kelly, supra note 163, at 957.
181. Ilya Somin, What if Kelo v. City of New London Had Gone the Other Way?, 45 IND. L.
REV. 21, 21 (2011).
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neighborhood revitalization, ones that engage the community about what is
best right now and what steps can be made toward a brighter future.182 Third,
tax foreclosure is not burdened by the statutory limitations associated with
eminent domain proceedings.183
The innate power of the sovereign to compel the sale of privately owned
land for public necessity has been unquestioned by the law but has greatly
troubled everyday citizens, particularly homeowners.184 When the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the City of New London had a right to take owneroccupied residential property as part of a redevelopment project that would
induce investment from the Pfizer Corporation, a tidal wave of antiredevelopment sentiment spread across the nation.185 Although Hurricane
Katrina shattered New Orleans later that same year, voters in Louisiana
subsequently voted to curtail the use of eminent domain authority for
redevelopment purposes.186 The reality that a property owner could be forced
to sell his or her land without fault or ability to prevent the sale profoundly
disturbs many Americans’ sense of what it means to be a homeowner.187
Although tax foreclosure can accomplish many of the same land assembly
goals used to justify eminent domain, it offers both a rationale for liquidation
and an opportunity to avoid it. The payment of property taxes is a fundamental
and universally applicable obligation of property ownership.188 Because a
person who does not pay property taxes does not expect to be able to escape
the consequences of delinquency, the prospect of tax foreclosure does not
threaten the security of tenure of property owners generally.189 The foreclosure
process itself is designed to allow a reasonable period of time for the debtor to
cure the default and preserve his or her ownership of the property.190 By
reconnecting the equity of redemption to land assembly and title clearing, tax

182. Kelly, supra note 163, at 928–29.
183. Alexander, supra note 116, at 756, n.108.
184. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1946) (“The power of eminent domain
is essential to a sovereign government.”).
185. John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2006, at A1.
186. Act of July 25, 2006, No. 851, § 1, 2006 La. Acts 2957 (This act authorized a ballot
initiative to amend Constitution to include, inter alia, the following: “Except as specifically
authorized by Article VI, Section 21 of this Constitution property shall not be taken or damaged
by the state or its political subdivisions: (a) for predominant use by any private person or entity;
or (b) for transfer of ownership to any private person or entity.” Art. VI, § 21 authorizes
condemnation of industrial property for transfer to new industrial investors.).
187. Kelly, supra note 163, at 930–31.
188. Alexander, supra note 116, at 765.
189. Kelly, supra note 106, at 67 n.9.
190. Id. at 72–73.
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foreclosure reclaims truly derelict properties in a way that builds upon a sense
of fair play.191
Land banking is nothing more than the acquisition of vacant properties for
subsequent return to productive use.192 Scaled-up tax foreclosure of delinquent
houses and lots allows for land assembly and a bundled disposition process.193
As with the controversial redevelopment plan challenged in Kelo, the transfer
from the public entity to the private recipient in an eminent domain
redevelopment is already arranged before the properties are taken, often
without meaningful community input.194 Because the tax foreclosure
mechanism is a creditor’s device, which does not need to require a public use
pretext, tax-delinquent vacant properties can be assembled as communities
engage with the publicly accountable land banking entity as to their
disposition.195 Land banking strategies can work in tandem with demolition of
vacant houses to create usable open space in severely undercrowded
neighborhoods.196 Newly created vacant lots can be made available to
homeowners as sideyards and to community greening groups as vegetable
gardens and pocket parks. By gaining control and taking responsibility for
vacant properties right now, land banks can set the stage for a grounded move
forward for communities contending with decades of demographic decline.
Finally, tax foreclosure, in addition to being free of the historical baggage
associated with eminent domain redevelopment, is not subject to the same
legal constraints that follow the delegation of eminent domain to local
governments. As an inherent power of the sovereign, the power of eminent
domain condemnation is vested originally in state legislatures.197 Those state
legislatures have the power to delegate that authority to other bodies but often
subject the invocation of that power to planning restrictions and further
legislative action at the local level.198 The actual condemnation award is
adjudicated through a jury trial process, incentivizing public agencies to pay
premiums to streamline acquisition.199 For the kind of land assembly needed
by severely distressed communities, a tax foreclosure approach is less costly
and more efficient.200

191. Id. at 73.
192. U.S. DEP’T. HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 16, at 1.
193. Id. at 2–3.
194. Nicole S. Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 446–47 (2007).
195. Id. at 453.
196. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV, supra note 16, at 3.
197. Kelly, supra note 163, at 933.
198. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (restricting condemnation of blighted areas); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 31-25-102 (2013) (regulating urban renewal condemnation).
199. See, e.g., Utility Center Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 985 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ind. 2013).
200. Kelly, supra note 106, at 117–18.
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III. FILLING IN THE GAPS
In this final part, I move beyond the case for foreclosure-based responses
to vacant houses and look at the actual tools being used to reconnect derelict
structures to a sustainable urban market. The vacant property problem has been
a top agenda item for many struggling cities well before the mortgage
foreclosure crisis made it a national emergency.201 The need for powerful tools
to repair faltering neighborhood real estate markets has already spurred
innovations along the lines advocated for above. An examination of the
essential features of these best practices provides guideposts for broader-based
reform.
In 1990, Baltimore enacted an amendment to its Building Code, an
adoption of the precursor to the IBC.202 The ordinance empowered the city, or
its community nonprofit designee, to file a judicial petition for appointment of
a receiver for any property that has an outstanding vacant building violation
notice.203 In order to avoid the appointment of the receiver, an owner, a
mortgagee, or any other party with a preexisting interest in that property has to
show a willingness and ability to rehabilitate the property.204 Once appointed,
the receiver's expenses, administrative as well as remedial, form the basis for a
super-priority lien on the vacant property.205
Many other code enforcement receivership statutes require long waiting
periods prior to a receiver's foreclosure on his or her special lien.206 Designed
for income-producing, occupied apartment buildings, these receivership
procedures provide for foreclosure only as a last-resort means of recouping the
costs of maintaining a truly abandoned building.207 Baltimore's ordinance,
however, authorizes the court to have the receiver foreclose on this lien before
rehabilitation work has even begun and auction the property off to any bidder
201. See Press Release, Smart Growth Am., Second Reclaiming Vacant Properties
Conference Begins Today (June 1, 2009), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/docu
ments/sga-release_06-01-09.pdf.
202. BLDG., FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALT. CITY, INT’L BLDG. CODE § 121 (2013).
203. BLDG., FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALT. CITY, INT’L BLDG. CODE § 121.2 (2013).
204. BLDG., FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALT. CITY, INT’L BLDG. CODE § 121.7 (2013).
205. BLDG., FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALT. CITY, INT’L BLDG. CODE § 121.13 (2013).
206. Ohio and Rhode Island both require that the receiver certify the abatement of the
nuisance prior to selling the property. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41(I)(1) (West 2013); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-44-12 (2013). Missouri permits sale after two years of inaction by parties in
interest. MO. REV. STAT. § 441.641 (2013) (prior to a 1998 amendment, the law required a tenyear waiting period). For a complete summary of state receivership statutes, see ALAN MALLACH,
BRINGING BUILDINGS BACK: FROM ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO COMMUNITY ASSETS 49–59
(2d ed. 2010).
207. None of the three different kinds of receivership statutes that Connecticut has created
allows for sale of the property by the receiver. MALLACH, supra note 206, at 52–53. Texas
requires three years of receivership control before sale is an option. Id. at 56–57.
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who has demonstrated the ability to rehabilitate the property immediately.208
Rather than require the receiver to try to obtain financing on a property that he
or she does not own, vacant building receivership offers nuisance abatement
using private capital.209
At its core, this remedy imposes a super-priority lien for failure to
eliminate a vacant building nuisance. The fact that the receiver’s lien takes
priority over all preexisting private mortgages and liens allows the threat of
foreclosure to be effective against lenders as well as owners. If these parties do
not step forward to fix the property, then the receiver is able to offer a clean
title to those who will.210
Creating new super-priority liens and foreclosure proceedings would be
beyond the scope of most local governments’ home rule authority.211 Baltimore
was able to create such a proceeding because of a relatively unique provision
in Maryland’s home rule provisions that allows the city “[t]o enact local laws
... for the protection and promotion of public safety, health, morals, comfort
and welfare, relating to ... the erection, construction, repair and use of
buildings and other structures; and to enact local laws providing appropriate
administrative and judicial proceedings, remedies, and sanctions for the
administration and enforcement of such ordinances and amendments.”212 On
the other hand, jurisdictions, such as Cleveland, Ohio, have been forced to go
to their state legislatures to enact such a remedy.213 The resulting receivership
law in Ohio creates a lien that takes priority over preexisting judgment liens
but not mortgages.214
Nearly as important as the super-priority nature of the lien is the timing of
the actual foreclosure sale. In order to make the threatened liquidation of the
property a true inducement to the delinquent owner to fix or transfer the
property, the foreclosure on the receiver’s lien cannot be a mere eventuality a
year or two down the road.215 Even if the foreclosure of the lien can be
postponed by the owner’s payment in full of the receiver’s costs, the owner
must be made to understand that he or she will pay for bringing property into
code compliance or the property will be sold.216

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

BLDG., FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALT. CITY, INT’L BLDG. CODE § 121.10 (2013).
BLDG., FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALT. CITY, INT’L BLDG. CODE § 121.9 (2013).
Id. at § 121.9.
See e.g., 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2962 (West 2013).
MD. CODE ANN., Local Gov’t § 10-317 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.14 (2000).
See id.
Kelly, supra note 10, at 223–24.
Id. at 219.
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Baltimore’s approach is somewhat unique in that it authorizes the court to
order the sale of the property before the code violations have been corrected.217
The transfer itself to a qualified bidder is part of the remedial strategy.218 By
allowing a pre-screened buyer to purchase the property in its dilapidated state,
this approach allows the party that is going to ready the property for productive
use to handle the entire rehabilitation process.219 Other receivership statutes
require the receiver to eliminate the outstanding code violations as a
prerequisite to any foreclosure on the unpaid lien.220 Indiana’s unsafe building
law is not clear on this point.221 A promising middle ground would be to
require that the receiver carry out any urgently needed repairs on the vacant
structure before putting it up for sale.
If the property is to be sold in anything less than pristine condition, it is of
great importance that bidders at the auction be pre-qualified as developers
willing and able to rehabilitate the property. Transferring the property from
one delinquent owner to another does nothing to remedy a vacant house
nuisance. Many cities have broad authority to conduct urgently needed repairs
to the exteriors of vacant houses and impose super-priority liens without
judicial appointment of a receiver.222 When foreclosed these liens enter into the
general tax sale process in which an array of speculators and debt collectors
bid alongside experienced developers.223 For a receivership sale remedy to be
an effective and legitimate means of achieving code compliance, bidders at any
such sale must be screened and must be held accountable on their commitment
to prompt rehabilitation of the property.224
The process of screening bidders for a receivership sale also helps ensure
that the properties are amenable to renovation using private capital.225 If a
vacant house is located in a market that is too weak to support the investment
needed to bring the property into compliance, a foreclosure based on failure to
adhere to code standards is not an appropriate response.226 Neighborhoods with

217. BLDG., FIRE, AND RELATED CODES OF BALT. CITY, INT’L BLDG. CODE § 121.10 (1990).
218. Kelly, supra note 10, at 219.
219. Id.
220. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41(I)(1) (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-44-12 (West
2013).
221. See IND. CODE § 36-7-9-20(a)(5) (2012).
222. MALLACH, supra note 206, at 47.
223. Id.
224. The Indiana Unsafe Building law, for instance, requires that “[t]he transferee in either a
public or private sale must first demonstrate the necessary ability and experience to rehabilitate
the premises within a reasonable time to the satisfaction of the receiver. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-79-20(a)(5) (2013).
225. Kelly, supra note 10, at 220.
226. Id. at 226.
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multiple vacant properties require the kind of investment coordination that
property tax foreclosure provides. The weakness of the real estate markets in
these neighborhoods facilitates tax foreclosure by discouraging owners from
paying property taxes on the vacant houses and lots they own.227
Every state provides some statutory scheme for collecting unpaid property
taxes by foreclosure.228 The vast majority of states use a combined sale and
foreclosure process to ensure both that the taxes due are paid in full and that
any leftover value in the property is made available to the stakeholders whose
interests have been liquidated.229 Most mortgage foreclosure proceedings

227. Id. at 211.
228. Judicial: ALA. CODE § 40-10-12 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. §
29.45.370 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-18201 (Supp. 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-157
(2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8742 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 197.502 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
63-1003 (2007); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200 / 21-75 (2012); IND. CODE § 6-1.1-24-4.7 (2013); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 79-2801 (Supp. 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.420 (West Supp. 2009); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5031 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 552
(Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. & First Special Sess. of 126th Legis.); MD. CODE ANN., TAXPROP. ANN. § 14-834 (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 65 (Westlaw through the
2013 1st Ann. Sess. and Ch. 1 of the 2014 2nd Ann. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 279.01 (Supp. 2009);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-41-11 (LEXIS through the 2013 Reg. Sess. and 1st and 2nd Extraordinary
Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 140.190 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-16-403 (2013); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 77-1902 (Supp. 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.5648 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:5-6
(West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-48 (2013); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1123 (McKinney
2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-355 (LEXIS through the 2013 Reg. Sess. Annotations through
Sept. 6, 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-40 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5721.10 (West
Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 312.010 (2011); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5860.301 (West,
Westlaw through Reg. Sess. Act 2013-88, 91, 93 to 97, 99 to 103, except 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7101 to end current through 2013-104); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-25 (2010); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-51-40 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-22-21 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.
and Sup. Ct. R. 13-12); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.91 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §
5191 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3340 (2009); WASH REV. CODE § 84.56.020 (2013).
Nonjudicial: ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-101 (2012); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 3691 (West Supp.
2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-11-101 (LEXIS through all laws passed at the First Reg. Sess. of
the Sixty-Ninth G.A. of the State of Colo. (2013)); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-3 (Supp. 2009); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 246-56 (2013); IOWA CODE § 446.15 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.60
(through 2013 P.A. 267 & includes 269-77); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:59 (2012); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 68, § 3105 (Westlaw through Ch. 23 (end) of the First Extraordinary Sess. of the 54th Legis.
(2013)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-2003 (LEXIS through 2013 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §
59-2-1303 (LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE § 11A-2-1 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 75.12 (through
2013 Wisc. Act 117 and all Sup. Ct. Orders entered before Jan. 17, 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
39-13-108 (2007).
229. Michigan provides for a public sale but applies the age-old remedy of strict foreclosure.
Thus, failure to redeem the property by payment of the taxes due results in a total forfeiture of the
property with any surplus going to the governmental creditor. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.60(4)
(through 2013 P.A. 267 & includes 269-77).
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auction the property only after the borrower’s time to redeem has elapsed.230 In
property tax collections, however, most proceedings to foreclose the equity of
redemption occurs only after the property tax lien has been sold to a private
bidder.231
Some states grant tailored periods of redemption for different types of
property interests.232 Although Kansas is patient with homestead owners,
giving them three years to pay, owners of vacant buildings receive only one
year after the sale to prevent foreclosure.233 Kansas has decided that the
community should not have to be particularly patient with owners of
unoccupied properties when “there has been a failure to perform reasonable
maintenance.”234
Crucial to the success of tax sale foreclosure as both a collection remedy
and a means of clearing title to abandoned properties is the super-priority
nature of the property tax lien, which allows it to take precedence over not only
ownership interest but also mortgage and judgment lien interests that predate
the tax delinquency.235 Because claims for unpaid property taxes take priority
over pre-existing private liens, all parties with substantial interests in the
property are entitled to notice of their opportunity to redeem.236 Constructive
notice, such as publication of an advertisement in a newspaper of general
circulation, can constitute constitutionally adequate notice, but only after
diligent attempts at direct notification have been made.237

230. See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOME
FORECLOSURE PROCESS 15, available at http://fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/SAR%20Home%20
Foreclosure%20Process_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
231. 26 U.S.C..§ 6323 (2013).
232. For instance, Kansas provides for a two-year post-sale redemption period during which
counties must postpone foreclosure to allow owners to save their property interests by paying off
any delinquencies. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2401a(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. and
Special Sess.). For homestead properties, owners have three years to redeem. § 79-2401a(b)(1).
233. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-2401a(a)(1), 79-2401a(b)(1), 79-2401(a)(2). Maryland provides
two types of accelerated post-sale foreclosure processes. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-833
(West 2008). Persons that purchase properties as part of a special tax sale of abandoned properties
may commence foreclosure proceedings the day after the sale. § 14-833(f). Even a property sold
at a conventional sale can be foreclosed upon six months after the sale, half the normal time
period, if a building on the property has been certified as needing substantial repair. § 14-833(e).
234. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2401a(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. and Special
Sess.).
235. Alexander, supra note 116, at 760.
236. Because mortgagees and judgment creditors have no actual ownership rights, their right
to redeem allows them to preserve their remedies for collecting money owed to them by the
property owners. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 558,
689–94 (4th ed. 2001).
237. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983). The constitutional right
to notice and opportunity to be heard does not allow legislators and judges the same flexibility in
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Effective reform of tax foreclosure laws impacting vacant properties
requires attention to the procedures for the sale of liens as well as to the time
for redemption afforded the owners and other stakeholders. A sensible
approach to the sale of tax liens on vacant and abandoned houses and the lots
resulting from their demolition allows local jurisdictions to facilitate
investment coordination without fear of severely underpricing important
receivables. A similarly tailored approach to the waiting period between the
sale of a tax certificate on a vacant and abandoned property and the issuance of
a deed for that property recognizes the urgency of getting such a property back
into productive use without undercutting the rights of other owners, especially
homeowners, to raise the money needed to prevent loss of their land to
foreclosure.
Unoccupied, derelict properties located in neighborhoods with insufficient
market strength to support their rehabilitation require special tax sale
procedures to facilitate their return to productive use. A great many of these
properties could not be sold, after a complete renovation, on the open market
for just the costs of the needed repairs. That is, even if one such vacant house
could be transferred in its dilapidated condition to a new, capable owner for $1,
the needed renovations would still not be economically feasible. As discussed
above, allowing a developer or team of developers to invest in all the vacant
houses in a neighborhood offers a way to reset the market paradigm that
constrains the influx of desperately needed capital.238 The prevalence of
significant tax delinquency makes tax foreclosure an ideal way to allow
coordinated title-clearing efforts. Unfortunately, the great size of tax
arrearages, when combined with legislated tax sale rules that require a
minimum bid no less than the amount of the tax delinquency, prevents these
properties from even taking the first step toward reconnection with the
market.239
While minimum bid provisions may make sense for tax sales generally,
they significantly harm efforts to return tax-delinquent vacant properties to
productive use. Many, if not all, states require that any bid at a conventional
tax lien auction to purchase a tax-delinquent property be sufficient to pay the
relevant state and local government taxes and related charges due on the
property.240 Generally, the potential for corruption and abuse in a mass auction
adjusting notification methods and standards to facilitate the more efficient foreclosure of vacant
and abandoned properties. I have argued elsewhere, however, that the nature of a stakeholder’s
relationship to a vacant and abandoned property can be a relevant consideration in determining
the process due him, her or it in a tax foreclosure proceeding. See generally Kelly, supra note
106.
238. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
239. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 30.
240. Id.
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of public receivables justifies the legislature’s insistence on receiving the full
value of what the public is owed. Vacant and abandoned properties with large
tax arrearages invariably remain unsold at the end of tax sales with such
minimum bid requirements.241
Land banking efforts, however, are demonstrating that vacant and
abandoned properties can be transferred to developers capable of returning
them to productive use as long as an auction mechanism is not relied upon
either to identify those buyers or to set the price of the sale. To accomplish the
appropriate bundling and pricing of vacant properties in need on investment
coordination, land banks must be empowered to purchase and foreclose on
vacant property tax certificates without being required to pay the full lien
value. As publicly accountable entities, they need to be able to work with
potential developers to identify coordinated investment opportunities and sell
the properties at prices that reflect the market realities and the public benefit of
having the properties returned to productive use. Auctions do not allow for the
verification of capacity and financing required for large-scale redevelopment
projects nor do they allow for the negotiations needed to produce thoughtful
pricing of the real property assets. To facilitate an ultimately more efficient
mode of vacant property disposition, minimum bid requirements must be
abandoned to allow transfers of qualifying tax certificates to land banks. States,
such as Kansas, have recognized the need to set post-tax-sale redemption
periods at different lengths to protect different kinds of property ownership.242
Those states facing significant concentrations of vacant properties in their
urban neighborhoods must shorten the minimum time for completion of the
foreclosure. For instance, Maryland requires most tax-sale purchasers to wait
six months before commencing judicial foreclosure proceedings, but properties
that have been certified as in need of substantial repair can be foreclosed upon
after 60 days.243 The waiting period is eliminated altogether for tax sale
certificates sold at special bulk sales designed to facilitate land banking
efforts.244 Likewise, Indiana requires a delinquent owner to redeem a property
within one year of a conventional tax sale;245 but, it shortens that redemption
period to 120 days for properties sold at a special sale without the standard
minimum bid requirement.246 These clear and reasonable differences in
redemption periods follow from the fact that foreclosure of vacant properties,
by definition, do not result in the displacement of legal occupants. Moreover,

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
MD. CODE. ANN. §14-833(a), (e) (West 2013).
MD. CODE. ANN. §14-833(f) (West 2013).
IND. CODE. §6-1.1-25-4(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
IND. CODE. §6-1.1-25-4(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
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the community need for investment in these properties requires a quicker
transition than that allowed to tax-foreclosed properties generally.
The major gap between conventional code enforcement and eminent
domain is filled by the remedies of vacant building receivership and tax sale
foreclosure. Both use an owner’s failure to meet basic public obligations as a
basis for liquidating all the title interests in the derelict property should the
stakeholders not step forward and bring the property into compliance. The
receivership remedy, which combines code enforcement and title-clearing
mechanisms, is only now being enacted in various jurisdictions.247 The tax
foreclosure proceeding, while widely available, requires major reform in many
jurisdictions if it is to be effective in accomplishing the investment
coordination goals for which it is uniquely suited.248 Together, these remedies
can complete a nearly seamless array of vacant property responses that can
allow local communities to reconnect any vacant property to a real estate
market that can return it to vitality.

247. See BLAKE ET AL., CONSERVATORSHIP HANDBOOK (2013), available at
http://www.housingalliancepa.org/sites/default/files/resources/ConservatorshipManual_Phila-fi
nal.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
248. ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 28–30.

